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by  Eui-Gak Hwang 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It has been more than sixty years since Korea gained her independence in 1945. But 
the division of the peninsula between the North’s communist system and the South’s 
capitalist system has led people ideologically split. In North Korea, today, many hungry 
people are “fighting for foods” while facing very oppressive dictatorial government.  
Most of adult people are members of the communist party, whether voluntary or not. 
They can not publicly criticize the Dear Leader, who is now running the regime at a 
hide in radiation-free underground stronghold near Pyongyang.  In the South, 
thousands of stomach-full dissidents are out in the streets “fighting against foods”, 
namely the US beef imports, with red head bands and candle-lights in every hands. 
Whatever the cloak must be, it is a cover-up to turn over the right wing regime.  People 
in both sides have been the victims of two alien conflicting ideologies for more than a 
half century. The resultant inflictions will fall eventually on Koreans, both ideological 
importers and blind followers. 
 
Keywords: Political ideologies, North and South Korea, Kim Jong-Il,  
 Lee Myung-Bak, Chuche idea, farming, humanitarian, US beef imports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professor emeritus of economics, Korea University, and Senior Research Professor of 
The International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development (ICSEAD), Japan 
Corresponding Auther: 11-4 Otemachi, Kokurakita, Kitakyusyu, Fukuoka,  
803-0814, Japan. 
Email: hwang@icsead.or.jp 
2 
 
1. The Division and Loss of Indigenous Identity 
   
The invisible fate worked to divide and to relocate innocent Korean people mostly 
regardless of their will between pro-communists camp and pro-capitalists group during 
the turmoil transition period of 1945-48 at the wake of the nation’s independence from 
Japanese yoke of 36 years.  National independence movement leaders had once fought 
hand in hand against Japanese occupation, but when the country gained independence 
the two groups began viviparously to break up for their respective political shares and 
interests in power.  When the same brethren made an internecine struggle against one 
another on the account of different political ideologies and power game, they became 
ruthless and devoured one another. Hostility continued to file up and no real 
reconciliation found any room between the two fratricidal enemies. Indeed, it has been 
impossible to reconcile the followers of capitalistic democracy with those followers of 
namely egalitarian communism in the evolving course of Korean history, just as is it 
impossible to mix fire and water. 
From the independence joy in August, 1945 until the North red army’s armed tanks 
rolling sounds awoke up the Seoulites in the early quiet Sunday morning of June 25, 
1950, the southern brethren had never imagined, nor prepared, that its communist 
counterpart was so well organizing to cross the 38th line to liberate its poor people from 
the U.S. imperialist’s followers in the south. The South had until then engaged only in 
endless political disputes in the course of experimenting the imported democratic 
system with no prior practical knowledge. Political terrors against opposition camps did 
often continue in both ways and general citizen’s mounting discontents toward 
politicians became daily events. In such a situation neither the weak government nor 
infant military leaders had paid any alert or little concern to watch over the organized 
war preparation under way in the other side of the 38th parallel division line.  In those 
days, many conscious intellectuals in the South began already to suspect the 
sustainability of the Seoul’s immature democratic system in turmoil, thus inclining to 
turn their hearts in favor of the then seemingly efficient system in the controlled 
socialist north.  This disgruntled social atmosphere contributed to pave the easy way 
for the communists to grasp the city of Seoul so quickly without strong inside resistance. 
3 
 
In no more than three days after communists overall attack, the heavily armed North 
soldiers could put the South’s capital city completely under their feet with many 
welcoming citizens waving red flags along the streets. Many innocent citizens did not 
foreknow this would be the regrettable invitation of their miserable nightmare 
afterwards under communist ruling. Once red army controlled the city, the North’s 
security officers would often visit houses after houses mostly during the nights in order 
not only to search for all man-powers either to mobilize to the front line or to 
reconstruct the bombed Han-river bridge and other bridges and roads but also to 
confiscate food and valuable household goods such as sleeping blankets with US brand 
label.  
All household goods made by American reactionary imperialists were collected by 
the newly arrived leftists, but their disposition was never known. Whenever they visited 
to search for a house, they pretended very gentle with comforting words to the host 
families. But after their visit, families were only left without grains while adult men, 
young or old in the family, if found, were unexceptionally forced to drag away. They 
used even to pierce the room roof with their rifle-edge knife, searching for anyone hid 
there. Young children and women had daily to pick up edible grasses or something from 
outskirts lands and hills so as to fill up their hungry stomach.  I was 10 years old at the 
start of Korean War and still remember how hungry I was.  One day my mother 
brought home nine sweet potatoes from somewhere in early morning of a day in mid-
August (according to news report from hidden radio, the pushing and pushed fights 
continued then cross over the Rack-dong River near Daegu region).  When she was 
boiling them, I thought they would be on our family special breakfast menu. My guess 
went wrong. She made three sweet potatoes as a bundle each and told me to sell them to 
passerby by displaying on a piece of old newspaper in the street corner.  There were 
also a few other sellers of the same products in the street.  Regardless of my 
competitors in this market, the 10 years old hungry boy could not tolerate the allurement 
and surrendered himself by eating up one out of each bundle consisting of three, 
reducing to each bundle of two sweet potatoes. Until the twilight shade, no passerby 
showed any mind of sympathy to buy the smaller potato bundle (as compared to other 
seller’s offer) from me. So eventually the unsold three bundles each now having two 
4 
 
potatoes were distributed for the mouths of other members in the family, frustrating a 
poor housewife’s naive calculation to raise some extra income from this potato business. 
During the three years (1950-53) of fratricidal war, every Korean was bereft without 
exceptions with the war disasters, losses of loved ones and neighbors and shrunken 
stomach.  The remnant had to go through the pains and tears of serious famine doubled 
with dry weather with no rain drops for the three war years. 
Most innocent Koreans, north and south, just struggled to survive only without 
questioning seriously why the nation was swirled into war game. Nor did grassroots 
barely concern to understand the evils hidden in those few elite’s ideological faiths and 
their attributes that would lead to harbor enmity and run very high to arouse action to 
eliminate one another.  
The bullets the ideological leaders dissipate are of course ideologically innocent and 
ideologically indifferent people.  The ideologically brain-washed leaders, yesterday or 
today, are usually ignorant and uncouth in sacrificing grassroots people for the sake of 
earning their political objectives.  They know how well to cover their real hearts with 
false patriotism, concealed love for people who bite their baits.  The events that 
brought war between two groups misguided by ideologically divorced leaders but for 
the same history, culture and ethnic foundation tell that the leading elite class were more 
important (alternatively rather ego-centered) in determining the live-and-die path than 
the people.  This simplified hasty conclusion is very contrary to what Bruce Cumings’ 
quote of the following: “The people were usually more important than the leaders. The 
deeper I have excavated, the more I have satisfied myself that the best was underneath, 
in the obscure depths. And I have realized that it is quite wrong to take these brilliant 
and powerful talkers, who expressed the thought of the masses, for the sole actors in the 
drama. They were given the impulse by others much more than they gave it to 
themselves. The principal actor is the people”  (Michelet). 1  Of course, the role and 
influence of actors would alter circumstantially depending upon whether it is socialistic 
theater or democratic theater. 
The three years of bloody conflict left millions of casualties (deaths, wounded,  and 
                                                
1 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II, The Roaring of the Contract 1947-1950 
(Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.237. 
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missing), devastated economies, north and south alike, but yet unsolved battlefields of 
almost the same size of land division as before the war under a 1953 truce agreement, 
Opposing political ideologies, along with their respectively different economic systems, 
have henceforth created further antagonistic hostility and feelings of bitter enmity 
between the two halves of the same country.2 
 
 
2. Kim Il-Sung’s Miscalculation and the After Years 
 
The North leader, Kim Il-Sung was later reported to have regretted that he invaded 
into the south, because his hasty miscalculation contributed only to fail in winning the 
support of people in the south.3 Unless the war had occurred, the south could have 
fallen sooner or later under his control without so much blood. Until the war broke out 
in 1950, there were still several leftist guerrilla units along with thousands of additional 
supporters in the south. The rampant corruption and revelry, unstable politics, endless 
stripes, vicious circle of poverty with mounting unemployment, and pro-leftist 
sentiments in the south were signaling to toll the death of the south system.  However, 
the war brought tremendous dislocation of leftist supporters from the south among all 
others.  The end of the war provided the south regime with good excuse to impose 
strong anti-communist wipe-outs and to tighten its political security; People had also 
learned a good lesson about many bad shades and lies of communism while north 
communists occupied the south. Along with civilian incompetence, social instability and 
people’s hope for better economy made a pave for the south military regimes to bud and 
bloom to make the most use of anti-communist measures in exercising political 
objectives.  Under the banner of cracking down leftist elements, the power group could 
easily control political dissentients, not to speak of suppressing human rights of 
                                                
2Eui-Gak Hwang, The Korean Economies: A Comparison of North and South (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 
1993) p.23 
3 However, the origins of the war have until recently been a matter of dispute. Officially North Korea has 
insisted that the US imperialists started the war, but hearsay backed by various documents from the Soviet 
archives showed that in 1949 and early 1950 Kim implored Stalin repeatedly to authorize an invasion of 
the South. The Kim’s regret words are also based on hearsay circulated among North defectors and North 
Korean watchers in the south. 
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opposing forces in the society.  The military regimes had in fact implemented their 
economic policies more efficiently and forcefully than any alternative civilian 
government would do. But they had produced countless dissentients for more than a 
quarter century ever since the general Park Chung-Hee seized power with a group of 
young Turks’ coup in 1961. They could make a big success in seizing power and 
winning majority peoples’ support under the fresh slogan for “the elimination of social 
unjustness, corruption and vicious circle of poverty” 
The Korean War and history path followed by a quarter of strong military culture in 
the south have resulted in the extreme division of “thought and faith” between “the 
before and mid-war generation” and “the young generation born after the 1960’s”. This 
division is a continuing source of generational and cultural clash.  But this diversity of 
thought and life style in the south is believed, if looked from positive angle, to greatly 
attributing to maturing democratic mode of the society, though the between-class 
conflicts are sometimes suspected to matter to the speed of economic and social take-off 
tempo. Good or bad, all this social evolution has been attributed to the past history 
through which generation after generation has accumulated various experience-based 
knowledge and cognition of conflicting ideological systems.  During the last three 
decades, South Korea has achieved a remarkable economic success surging to the 12th 
or 13th rank of world economic strength order in 2008 with no major natural resources 
but for about 45 million populations in a small land area of 98,190 square meters, 
slightly larger than Indiana of the United States. This miracle transition from “hunger to 
affluence” could be possible largely based on private incentive-oriented free market 
economic system in South Korea.  This open economic system has been supplemented 
by the past experiences of hardships, pains and tears that all walks of people have gone 
through. This does not of course rule out that macro-economic achievement does not 
involve any unrighteousness, unjustness, or other social dark aspects.  Not at all.  
There are mounting problems such as widening income and wealth disparity, moral and 
ethical depravity, and much human derailment in South Korea as in other market 
economies.  But anyone can freely choose a decent life as long as he or she is willing 
to work and to abide by law. This does not mean, as already briefly mentioned above 
that there have been no political and human right suppression in the South.  Many 
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children and descendants of those who were classified as ideologically impure elements 
before and after the Korean War had been systematically excluded from the 
employment in public organizations or social activities. Through a prolonged time of 
hardship and distress under right wing regimes, they sought to harbor for jobs mostly in 
schools and publishing houses, heaping hardened hatred upon hatred against the ruling 
conservatives. In schools, particularly elementary and junior high schools, those 
teachers have formed an alliance with outside discontent forces and persistently 
propagated both anti-government and anti-American brainwash to sensitive young 
pupils.  During the 1980s and 1990s when the new refloating wave of democracy set in 
the South, these groups began to float up on the surface of all parts of the South, 
shaking the country with their crimson head bands and jackets in much more different 
mode and environment than ever before.  Riding on their full supports, two new liberal 
regimes of both Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun could ground in consecutively 
grasping powers in the South for exactly 10 years from 1997. This period is often now 
called a decade insufflated widely by would-be leftist forces that came out in the sun.  
The 17th President Lee Myung-Bak (inaugurated on 25 February, 2008) confessed 
that “the past 10 years influences of former two Presidents (Kim Dae-Jung and Roh 
Moo-Hyun) are too big across the landscape of the South”.  The remark was made 
when he met news reporters (May15, 2008) on the issue of Korea-US FTA ratification.  
He expressed his deep concern on the ever mounting worrisome number of candle-
carrying street demonstrators in fierce protests against the unrealized risks of downy 
beef imports from the United States. President Lee made a special address to the people 
on May 22, 2008 that he is “very sorry” for having failed in reflecting fully the wide 
spectrum of public opinion in the process of his policy decision on the beef imports, and 
assured that his government would humbly do it’s utmost to enhancing the public health.  
This series of events burst out of US beef imports reflects not only that there has greatly 
improved the freedom of speeches and organized protests, but also the lowered position 
of power in the South.  As such it appears sometimes in mud, but the democratic 
system has been moving forward with higher per capita “mean income” from a less than 
80 U.S. dollars in early 1960s to above 20,000 U.S. dollars in 2007, in spite that 
“income standard deviation” enlarged in due course. In the South, political ideology has 
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sometimes beefed up many innocent victims, but in due course, human right and 
democratic freedom has grown greatly along with improved income and wellbeing of 
the people as a whole. 
On the other side of the peninsula, the Marxist brethren have been above all missing 
the market incentive motives in every aspects of economic life.  The north Hermit 
Kingdom appears today to come near to the no-outlet corridor. There are reports on 
mass starvation and death of grassroots reaching to about three million in numbers as of 
mid-2008, due to the shortages of food, medicine, and other basic necessities. What a 
grievous victim of the deceiving ideology which has assured repeatedly the people with 
fake promise on “white rice”, “meat soup”, “tile-roof house”, and “silk clothes”, made 
firstly by Kim Il-Sung back from November, 1962, the second year of the North’s First 
Seven Year Plan.  We need somewhat to retrospect the past course of the communist 
regime in the North. 
 
 
3. Brief Retrospect on the North Chuche Hermit Kingdom 
 
In the North, Kim Il-Sung, who was a 33-year old guerrilla commander when he 
seized power with the support of the Soviet army in 1945, had effectively created a 
highly centralized system that accorded him unlimited power. He had systematically 
purged his political opponents.  He had fully cultivated his power to generate a 
formidable cult of personality for himself and to establish a communistic monarchy 
kingdom which could pave a way of making his son Kim Jong-Il as his heir from early 
1970s. While following a Stalinist control line, he had distanced himself from Marx-
Engels’ intrinsic philosophy. In other word, he was a pedigree-centered impure socialist. 
Most orthodox communists had to compromise with this new hybrid communist ruler 
Kim Il-Sung and his dear son Kim Jong-Il only if for survival in the North. Otherwise 
they had either to go under political surface or to defect the North with the great cost 
and life risk of the remnant of their families.4 
                                                
4 The most sensational defection of the high-level insider from the North to the South was the 1997 case 
of Hwang Jang-Yop who was speaker of the Supreme People’s Assembly from 1972 to 1984. He had 
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But in the early two decades, the North could successfully mobilize people to 
effectively rebuild the North Korean economy which had quite formidable heavy 
industrial bases along with abundant coal and hydroelectric resources.  The socialistic 
approach of running the economy had the North’s per capita income ahead of that of the 
South until the end of 1974. 
The people’s workers had demonstrated their eagerness for production in the early 
stage of the socialist economy. The hard working culture was systematically driven by 
collective slogan and pushing encouragement for the quick construction of a great 
socialist paradise.  But the working ethics began gradually to erode over time as 
workers were awakening to the system that would principally equalize all at the expense 
of incentives.5  They began to learn how to meet the daily or monthly top-down targets 
of production.  The quantity targets could be less hardly accomplished when they 
attended less concern about the quality aspects of what they were producing. In the state 
of missing ownership, state control functions had crucially expanded in every 
production fields, but only with diminishing efficiency and effects. Everybody also 
came to know that “one who is today the leader may be tomorrow the one receiving 
leadership” in the communist society. In such circumstances, if leader fail to monitor his 
or her subordinates effectively, as with the principal-agent problem, the leader and 
subordinates as well may be monitored by pressures from within their own organ. This 
leads to mounting mutual disbelief. Thus, the autarky economy lacking humanly trust 
and confidence one another as a whole began to erode. Indeed, the North Korea has 
explosively lagged behind the economy of the South ever since the turn of mid-1970s. 
Under the slogan of ‘communist’ economic construction, North Korea had aimed at 
building a self-reliant economy under a central planning and management.  
                                                                                                                                            
educated Kim Jong-Il at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang in which he was appointed president of the 
university in 1965, the year after the Dear Leader graduated.  Hwang was principal authority on Juche 
Idea, which became the official credo of the DPRK in the 1972 constitution. But Hwang’s world began to 
erode when an article in Nodong Sinmun (official newspaper) attacked “careerists and conspirators (who) 
outwardly pretend to uphold the leader and be faithful to the revolutionary cause while seeking another 
dream inwardly and making conspiracies behind the scenes”. Being certain it was aimed at him, he chose 
in Beijing to defect Pyongyang on his way back after delivering the main address at a Cho Chongryun 
(pro-North resident’s association) symposium in Japan in early February 1997. 
5 In 1947, Kim Il-Sung borrowed Lenin’s Biblical principle that “he that does not work, neither shall he 
eat”. But the socialist principle, “that from each according to their ability, to each according to their 
work”, had not been practically challenged for application in the North. 
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After observing the ideological and border dispute (clash) between the post-Stalinist 
Soviet Union and Mao’s China in 1953-55, Kim Il-Sung sought to exercise autonomy 
by keeping an equal distance between the then Soviet Union and China. North Korea 
has advanced persistently the ‘chuche idea’ (self-reliance doctrine) as her guiding 
ideology in politics, economy, and military after Kim Il-Sung’s first initiative remark at 
the Workers’ Party Central Committee in 1955.  It became the principle guideline in 
the North’s new constitution promulgated in December 1972, with the ‘Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy’ as a supporting pillar. Kim Jung-Il, son and heir-designate, enriched further 
the chuche idea as a tool for fostering his political position in the power transition that 
started since 1972. As in other communist economies, materials and labors are the 
means of production owned collectively by the people in the form of ‘all-people 
ownership’. Paradoxically, individual workers like physical inputs are nothing but 
means and tools of production owned by the state (or party), which in vague communist 
theory is geared to serve ‘the promotion of the material well-being of the masses’.  The 
reality has, in turn, given ‘the state being represented successively by the Greater 
Leader and Dearer Leader’ carte blanche overridden the grass-roots. As such, the 
helpless masses are being consumed as altar sacrifices not only to serve for the great 
father-land but also to exalt the state ideology. 
 
4. Different Roads 
 
With no exceptions, the pronounced goal of political leaders in every society would 
aim to help people enjoy higher income and well-being with the provision of individual 
dignity and freedom. Very often, though, in the primitive stage of economic growth, the 
priority on higher material well-being would precede over individual human right and 
freedom. Given the proposition, the approaches to higher material well-being might 
deviate from one another in different ideological systems. One major difference 
between the market economy (South Korea) and the socialist system (North Korea) lies 
in the decision-making criterion as to ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘for whom’ to produce.  In 
deciding what to produce, consumer preference revealed by market demand plays a very 
crucial role in the market-oriented economy, while social preference valued by the 
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ruling leaders dominates in the command economy.6 In North Korea, the priorities of 
production has been ranked down from heavy-industrial (military-related) and public 
goods, producers’ goods, light industry goods, and lastly consumer goods.  Consumer 
preferences were largely placed in the tail of the menu table for the sake of heavy 
industrial and military sectors in most socialist economies from the Stalinist period. 
Such discriminative policy prevailed until the socialist bloc came to dissolve at the 
wake of the fall of Soviet Union in 1989-90.  North Korea was but exception. The 
trend has not fundamentally changed yet in North Korea as the sustained ruling class 
and their mind-sets have kept intact.  On the other hand, the South capitalists moved 
from the development of light and consumer industries to capital intensive industrial 
policy as the economy advanced to the higher stage of development. The South leaders 
believed from the beginning that an international system of exchange would solve 
everyone’s problems in the long run, though they understood that some domestic infant 
industrial bases needed protection in early pre-takeoff stage. Unlike the South, however, 
the North persistently pursued its self-reliant policy with focal emphasis on enhancing 
its formidable heavy industrial complexes and energy sources with which it started 
formerly. As time passed, the independent North economy began to reveal seriously the 
economic and technological backwardness in less than two decades. The self-reliant 
doctrine faced mounting constraints in its “socialistic accumulation”. None the less, the 
resources for expanding human technocrats became severely limited, apart from urging 
the “people’s workers” to unite and to tighten their belts for their great father-land and 
Greater Leader.  It was natural outcome in that hybrid regime, where overnight people 
became proletarian cadres, workers, or technicians, coming overwhelmingly from the 
poor peasants and bottom classes in the course of new birth of the revolutionary 
communist state. The proletarian cadres had ruthlessly purged out the remnants of 
intellectual technocrats as reactionary elements over an extended period before and after 
Korean War.  All such reckless politics and autarky in North Korea turned out to 
authentically be the sources of the economy’s dilemma vividly aggravating from mid-
1970s.  The economic battle situation between the North and South turned around in 
1975-76 to show the capitalistic open market economy run ahead of the autarkic self-
                                                
6  Eui-Gak Hwang, ibid. p.29. 
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reliant one.7   
Per capita income evaluated at North’s official trade exchange rate was about 175 U.S 
dollars in 1960, and rose to about 750 U.S. dollars in 1975, but is now estimated around 
800 U.S. dollars in 2008. The estimates of per capita income depends, of course, on 
several key factors like exchange rates applied, output accounting methods different in 
each systems, as well as purchasing power of a unit of nominal income in the respective 
economies, admitting the functions of money to differ completely between market-
oriented economy and self-sufficiency seeking socialist economy.8  
 
 
5. Mass Starvation under Plenary Power Elites 
 
It is apparent that the North chuche economy has been being trapped in short food 
supply due to not only system-made mistakes but also continued punishing weather 
conditions. In particular, the hardships have been mainly attributed to the out-of-order 
functioning of the socialist system since the early 1990s. Instead of “white rice and meat 
soup”, many people in the North are known not to have had something enough to fill 
their hungry stomach. According to recent reports leaked out of the North, many hungry 
people are seeking to cross the border into China to sell their labor and body in 
exchange of foods.  The annual shortage of food has amounted to between 2.5 million 
tons and 1.5 million tons depending on each year during the period of 1990-2007. North 
Korea’s minimum demand for grains is approximated to about 7.0 million ton annually 
for both human consumption (about 5.5 million ton) and animal feed and industrial use. 
In more detail, North Korea minimum food requirement for human consumption in 
1995/96 was about 5,145 thousand ton, but only 4,563 thousand ton was available for 
total 21,685 thousand of population, of which domestic production accounted for 3,451 
thousand ton, while 962 thousand ton and 150 thousand ton were supplied from foreign 
sources (including China) and South Korea respectively.  In 2005/06, 23,165 thousand 
                                                
7 See Eui-Gak Hwang (1993), ibid, tables 3.11(a) and 3.11(b), given in pages 121-122, for the per-capita 
GNP estimates of both North Korea , 1946-1990 and South Korea, 1953-1990. 
8 See Eui-Gak Hwang (1993), ibid. pp.60-62 on the functions of money in North Korea and also refer to 
Eui-Gak Hwang (1984), Monetary Economics (Kyung-Sae Won Publishing Co.) in Korean. 
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people needed minimum amount of 5,496 million ton of grains which met barely with 
4,540 thousand ton of domestic production, 450 thousand ton from foreign import and 
500 thousand ton from South Korea. In the latter example, supply and demand was 
marginally balanced. 
However, the problem lied in the reality that total supply was not equally distributed 
to all people. The ruling power class and military had taken as usual the large share, 
leaving the common people still starved unless they could secure additional food 
through all possible means and routs within or outside the country. In short supply 
society, corruption and black markets would without exception be rampant, resulting in 
wide disparity in living standard to curl up the so-called egalitarian ideology.  Brutal 
political suppression and economic hardships have so far produced thousands of 
dissidents and defectors from the North, whose numbers are rising greatly in recent 
years. Even discontent high officers and military personnel are increasingly joining in 
the exodus, which surely signals the upcoming of collapsing regime in North Korea.  
So far, North Korea has tried to strictly control news and mass media to keep people 
from awakening about the prosperous South.  But various evidence of humanitarian 
aid from the South and hearsays on the economic success south of the truce line are 
known widely spread among populace. The leaders in the North perhaps overlooked the 
Korean old saying, that is, “a footless word can travel 1000 li (240 km) over night”. 
 
 
6. For Whom the Mourning Bell Tolls? 
 
The North leaders had probably not “calculated” the would-be eventual end-stop 
when they allowed the South brethren to invest for tourism at Mt. Kumgang and later 
for Kaesung Special Economic Zone. They are blind to trade their strongholds of self-
reliant system with dollars, without fully understanding that “money will matter to 
override their closed system”.  Money from capitalistic markets will sooner or later 
shake off the dull communist society.  If otherwise, the self-reliant system will come to 
self-collapse within itself either due to starveling epidemics or mass revolts.  
The current ruler Kim Jong-Il, was de-factor power practice from 1972 according to 
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Hwang Jang-Yop’s testimony, but was officially designated as his father’s successor in 
1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until Kim Il-Sung’s death in 
July 1994. Having deteriorated his country’s economy due to mismanagement, he has 
tacitly gambled to secure international economic aid while developing long-range 
missiles and nuclear program for his prodigious bargain sticks ever since the mid-1990s. 
Though, this outwardly irrational gamble may save him to stay longer in power as U.S. 
George Bush administration appears to somewhat enjoy to play with Kim at the Six-
Party Talks (involving North Korea, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the US, 
that began in August 2003) against its early strong rhetoric. In rhetoric, George Bush 
started very strong against Kim’s toy of military provocations, but in reality he appears 
seemingly interested in prolonging Kim’s regime for some undisclosed cause. 
But it is very likely that Kim Jong-Il’s policy of ostensible diplomatic and economic 
“self-reliance” coupled with his increasingly oppressive and draconian ruling will 
shorten his fate and his regime.  It is not possible to predict about the sure way how 
North Korea would falter and fall.  
North’s Kim Jong-Il was reported to express his deep impression and surprise at the 
cataclysmic wonderful changes of Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing when he visited 
China in 2005.  But the North Leader seems yet not being certain if his small and 
heavily closed poor economy can follow the Chinese model based on both wide 
openness and market-oriented incentives.  Openness will bring in “fresh air with lot of 
flies”, but Kim is afraid that he can be no longer capable to “catch and kill those flies”9. 
Can he dare otherwise to follow the path of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “perestroika and 
glasnost” whose ideology gave way to pragmatism and dramatic change in the Soviet 
Union in 1989?   Probably the only option for the Kim family to take is to keep and to 
prolong the “status quo”, strengthening his teams’ security.  Regardless whether the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea wants to change or not, however, the shade is 
already approaching toward the fall of the North regime. Kim may be lucky only if he 
can avoid the way the decades-long Romania dictator Nicoale CEAUSESCU was 
                                                
9 This is one of famous notes made by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Deng said that if China opened its door to 
outside world, “many capital and new technology” (‘fresh air’) would flow into China but with “many 
capitalistic west’s negative cultures and political elements” (‘flies’). He suggested “flies” could be caught 
after “fresh air” was introduced.  Another famous Deng’s analects is “ If a cat catches mice, what does it 
matter if it’s black or white?, which is, “Don’t ask whether a policy is socialist, ask whether it works”. 
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overthrown and executed in late 1989. 
 
 
7. The Shelter for Coward Leaders 
 
According to a newspaper interview with a defected high ranking North Korean 
general (three stars) called Mr. Ahn Young-Chul (pseudo-nym), Kim Jong-Il has been 
spending most of his time in a radiation-free stronghold, specially constructed two-story 
underground command post with advanced equipments in two dozens of office rooms of 
total space of about 200 square meters10. The bunker named as “Chul-Bong-Kak 
(meaning iron-hill-palace)” is believed to locate at about 15km north-east from the Kim 
Il-Sung Square in Pyongyang city”. This bunker is connected with about 80km 
underground tunnel to the Nampo port in the west coast.  His daily hide in the bunker 
began just after he was first informed of the United States-led invasion on Iraq in March 
2003.  Kim Jong-Il is being obsessed with the fear of the US decapitating his regime. 
To protect his own and his followers’ safety, he has claimed the toils and hungers of 
numerous people for constructing this palace-like fortress.  
Just as the innocent people have been victims of ideological organ and chronic 
economic problems, so are the North leaders also being victimized in the World 
ideological conflicts and their policy failure?  As compared to the leaders’ soft-landing 
in most capitalist ideology camps, the communist dictatorial leaders are unsure about 
their end days which would be paid off by their deeds. 
The North Kim Jong-Il, born in February 1942, is now known not physically and 
mentally health.  Kim Jong-Il, chairman of the National Defense Commission, is 
centered along with the Kim Jong-Il military operation core members which encompass 
Kim Du-Nam, operation head, Cho Myung-Rok, political bureau chief of the Supreme 
Command Headquarter, Kim Yong-Chun, command-in-chief of People’s Army, Kim 
Myung-Sup, operation head of DPRK Workers Party (KWP), and about 120 leaders of 
                                                
10 The first story on the defection of Mr. Ahn, who made the second defection case of high ranking North 
Korean officer following Hwang Jang-Eup in 1998, was first reported in a Japanese monthly magazine 
“GENDAI (Contemporary)”, June, 2003.  A Korean internet newspaper, The Independence had an 
exclusive interview recently with this defector and reported the details on the bunker constructs as well as 
North Korea’s military organization, on May 21, 2008. 
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both the People’s Armed Forces and the KWP. 
 
 
8. Who will likely take over after Kim Jong-Il?  
 
As of mid-2008, the notable figure in North Korea is General Kim Du-Nam who is 
the third son of Kim Yong-Nam, president of Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). He is 
now ‘general superintendent’ of the People’s Army, second only to Kim Jong-Il in the 
North power hierarchy. 
If something happens to Dear Leader, it is likely for this man to take over the interim 
period supreme power post in DPRK.  It is not known much about his personal favors 
or positions on neighboring nations.   The question here is how longer the North 
political cadets can sustain their status quo yet sticking to their bigotry chuche ideology 
in every aspects of the state management. Unless the North is to undertake reforming its 
system including the so-called chuche farming, it appears unlikely that the North can 
save its thousands of people from on-going current starvation and male nutrition 
dilemma. The only sure key for the North Korea to get out of its serious economic set-
backs is to reform its stubborn and closed collective economic system into well guided 
incentive-driven economy, learning from the lesson that Deng Xiaoping had bravely 
adopted for China since 1978.  In fact, Kim Jong-Il could have adopted the similar 
course of the early Chinese economic reform by criticizing the Greater Leader’s past 
policy failures immediately after his father Kim Il-Sung’s death in 199411. He was then 
a coward and he is still not a true egalitarian communist in that he is afraid of importing 
any reform (perestroika) and opening (glasnost) policy which he fears might turn over 
his power structure and life12. Having been cowards, he and his followers are now 
increasingly facing intestine intolerance which will be no longer in their control capacity. 
As of summer 2008, the food shortage stricken North Korea is known to use the 
humanitarian food aids from outside world mostly to feed its cadets and residents in 
                                                
11  I wrote a newspaper article (Dong-A Ilbo, September 12, 1994) suggesting that Kim Jong-Il could be 
the North Korean successful leader like the Chinese Deng Xiaoping if he bravely differentiated himself 
from his father. . 
12 Kim Jong-Il made it clear that the North will not accept both reform and open policy when the former 
South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun visited him in Pyongyang in October 2007. 
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Pyongyang city and its neighborhood prefectures, and military forces, while leaving 
thousands of grass-roots to remain at the state of nearly “starved”.  
In concluding. North Korea’s food needs are very likely to continue increasingly 
insatiable under its on-going chuche farming.  The hungry people who are victims of 
the communist chuche ideology will fight for  foods if not to perish inevitably. 
Ironically, thousands of ideologically split and stomach full people in the South are 
fighting in summer 2008 against Lee Myung-Bak regime with candle lights each in their 
hands under the cloak of opposing the beef imports from the United States.  It is really 
a regrettable reality that the homogeneous ethnic people in the Korean peninsula have 
been divided long and made the victims of “either too less or too much food” under 
those conflicting ideologies.  The victimized people are victimizing themselves with 
no much regard to whichever camps they are destined to belong.  The resultant 
inflictions will fall eventually on both ideological offenders and sufferers alike.  
 
You shall hear of wars and rumors of wars, but see to it that you are not alarmed. 
Such things must happen, but the end is still to come. Nation will rise against nation, 
and kingdom against kingdom. There will be famines and earthquakes in various places. 
All these are the beginning of birth pains. 
                                 -Matt.24:6,7,8. 
